Abstract-In this paper we introduce Creek, a low-latency, eventually consistent replication scheme that also enables execution of strongly consistent requests. Creek disseminates the messages among the replicas using only a gossip protocol. Similarly to state machine replication (SMR), Creek totallyorders all requests, but does so using two different mechanisms: a timestamp-based one and one built on top of our novel broadcast primitive, conditional atomic broadcast (CAB). The former is used to establish a tentative order of all requests for speculative execution and works also within each partition, when partitioning of network occurs. On the other hand, CAB is used only for the strongly consistent requests to ensure their linearizable execution, and is available whenever distributed consensus can be solved. The execution of a strongly consistent request also stabilizes the execution order of the causally related weakly consistent requests. Creek uses multiversion concurrency control to efficiently handle requests' rollbacks and reexecutions resulting from the mismatch between the tentative and the final execution orders. In the tests conducted using the TPC-C benchmark, Creek offers up to 3 times lower latency in returning client responses compared to the state-of-the-art speculative SMR scheme, while maintaining high accuracy of the speculative execution (92-100%).
I. INTRODUCTION
A lot of research has been devoted in the last years to eventually consistent replicated data stores, such as modern NoSQL databases (e.g., [1] [2] [3] ). It is because these systems, unlike their strongly consistent counterparts (e.g., traditional relational database systems [4] ), are scalable, guarantee high availability, and provide low response times. These traits make them the essential tools used to build globally accessible services running on the Internet, that are able to cope with the traffic generated by millions of clients.
Developing systems or services using eventually consistent data stores is often difficult and error prone, because one needs to anticipate the possibility of working on skewed data due to weaker consistency guarantees provided by such a data * The POIR.04.04.00-00-5C5B/17-00 project is carried out within the TEAM programme of the Foundation for Polish Science co-financed by the European Union under the European Regional Development Fund. The experimental evaluation has been carried out using the computing resources provided by the Poznań Supercomputing and Networking Center (PSNC). store. 1 Moreover, programmers, who are used to traditional relational database systems, miss the fully fledged support for serializable transactions, which, naturally, cannot be provided in a highly-available fashion [6] [7] . Therefore, in recent years, various NoSQL vendors started adding (quasi) transactional support to their systems. These add-on mechanisms are often very prohibitive and do not perform well. For example, both Riak and Apache Cassandra do not offer cross-object/crossrecord transactions [8] [9] . Additionally, Riak allows strongly consistent (serializable) operations to be performed only on distinct data [8] , whereas using the so called light weight transactions in Apache Cassandra on data that are accessed also in the regular, eventually consistent fashion leads to undefined behaviour [10] .
In the past various researchers attempted to incorporate transactional semantics into eventually consistent systems. Among others, the proposed solutions assumed weaker guarantees for transactional execution (e.g., [11] [12] [13] ) or restricting the semantics of transactions (e.g., [14] [15] ). Interestingly, the first eventually consistent transactional systems, namely Bayou [16] and the implementations of EventuallySerializable Data Services (ESDS) [17] , followed a different approach. In these systems, each server speculatively totalorders all received client requests without prior agreement with other servers. The final request serialization is established by a primary server. In case the speculation is wrong, some of the requests are rolled back and reexecuted (Bayou), or, to obtain the response for a new client request, much of the requests whose final execution order is not yet established are repeatedly reexecuted (ESDS). Understandably, such implementations cannot perform and scale well. Moreover, they are not fault-tolerant because of the reliance on the primary. However, these systems have one very important trait: reasoning about their behaviour is relatively easy and comes intuitively, because, similarly to state machine replication (SMR) [18] [19] , which executes all requests on all servers in the same order, on each server there is always a single serialization of all client requests the server knows about.
In this paper we take inspiration from Bayou and ESDS, and propose Creek, a novel fault-tolerant transactional replication scheme that features mixed weak-and-strong semantics. Clients submit requests to Creek in a form of arbitrary (but deterministic) transactions, called operations, each marked as weak or strong. Creek executes weak operations optimistically thus ensuring low-latency responses, in the order corresponding to the operations' timestamps that are assigned upon operation submission. On the other hand, strong operations are executed optimistically (similarly to weak operations), yielding tentative responses, but eventually their final operation serialization is established and a stable response is returned to the client. The final operation execution order is established using our new total order protocol, called conditional atomic broadcast (CAB), which is based on indirect consensus [20] . The messages broadcast using CAB are as small as possible and are limited to the identifiers of strong operations. The contents of all (weak and strong) operations are disseminated among Creek replicas using only a gossip protocol. Creek leverages multiversioning scheme [21] to facilitate concurrent execution of operations as well as to minimize the number of necessary operation rollbacks and reexecutions.
Creek can gracefully tolerate (partial) node failures, because CAB can be efficiently implemented by extending a quorumbased protocol, such as Multi-Paxos [22] . When network partitions occur, replicas within each partition are still capable of executing weak operations and obtaining tentative responses to strong operations, and converging to the same state (when the stream of client request ceases). Formally Creek guarantees linearizability [23] for strong operations, and fluctuating eventual consistency [24] for weak operations.
Creek causally binds the execution of strong and weak operations, so that the execution of operations of different types is not entirely independent. More precisely, for any strong operation op, if its tentative response was produced on a replica state that included the effects of the execution of some weak operation op , the stable response of op will also reflect the effects of the execution of op .
We use the TPC-C benchmark [25] to test the performance of Creek in comparison to other replication schemes that enable arbitrary transactional semantics and from which Creek draws inspiration: Bayou, SMR, and a state-of-the-art speculative SMR scheme [26] . By leveraging the multicore architecture of modern hardware, Creek easily outperforms SMR and Bayou. Creek provides throughput that is on-par with the speculative SMR scheme, but exhibits much lower latencies in serving client requests (up to 3 times lower for weak transactions and up to 15% lower for strong transactions). In the vast majority of cases (92-100%, depending on the scenario), the effects of the speculative request execution correspond to the final execution order as established by solving distributed consensus among Creek replicas.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. We discuss related work and specify the system model in Sections II and III. Next, in Section IV we specify CAB, our new broadcast protocol. In Section V we present the Creek scheme and then evaluate it in Section VI. We conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
As we already stated earlier, Creek is inspired by Bayou [16] and ESDS [17] . There are a number of subtle characteristics of both systems that we have not yet mentioned. Unlike in Creek, in Bayou updating transactions do not provide return values. Bayou also features dependency check and merge procedure mechanisms, that allow the system to perform applicationlevel conflict detection and resolution. We do not make any (strong) assumptions on the specification of operations handled by Creek (see also Section V-A), so these mechanisms can be emulated on the level of operation specification, if required.
Creek fulfills the specification of ESDS, although ESDS features somewhat richer interface than Creek, because it allows the user to attach to an operation an arbitrary causal context that must be satisfied before the operation is executed. However, Creek can be easily extended to accommodate the full specification of ESDS. Interestingly, the basic implementation of ESDS [17] did not maintain an up-to-date state that is updated every time a new operation is executed. Instead, in order to obtain a response to an operation, ESDS first created a provisional state by reexecuting (some of) the previously submitted operations. Local computation was assumed to happen instantaneously. Naturally, this assumption is not realistic, so an optimized version of ESDS has been implemented, which, to some degree, limited the number of operation reexecutions and network usage [27] .
We are aware of several systems that similarly to Creek feature requests that can be executed with different consistency guarantees. The system in [28] enables enforcing two kinds of stronger guarantees than causal consistency, by either a consistent numbering of requests, or the use of the three-phasecommit protocol. Unlike Creek, the system does not enforce a single total order of all client requests. Zeno [29] is very similar to Bayou, but it has been designed to tolerate Byzantine failures. Li et al. [30] demonstrate Gemini, a replicated system that satisfies RedBlue consistency. Gemini ensures causal consistency for all operations, but unlike the strong (red) operations, the weak (blue) operations must commute with all other operations. Burckhardt et al. [31] describe global sequence protocol (GSP), in which client applications perform operations locally and periodically synchronize with the cloud, the single source of truth. The cloud is responsible for establishing the final operation execution order. Changes to the execution order might lead to operation rollbacks and reexecutions in the client applications. When the cloud is unavailable, GSP does not guarantee progress: the clients can issue new operations that are executed locally, but they are not propagated to other clients. In effect, when the cloud is down, each client is forced to work in a separate network partition.
Since in Creek all operations are eventually serialized, the research on speculative execution in state machine replication (SMR) is also relevant. In basic SMR, every server sequentially executes all client requests (transactions) in the same order [18] [19] . To this end, SMR might rely on the atomic broadcast (AB) (also called total order broadcast) protocol to ensure that all servers deliver the same set of requests in the same order. The speculative schemes based on SMR (e.g., [32] [33] [26] ) start the execution of a request before the final operation order is established, to minimize latency in providing response to the client. However, the response is withheld until the system ensures the execution is serializable. Hence, these approaches do not guarantee low-latency responses.
To enable SMR to scale, some schemes (e.g., [34] [35]) utilize partial replication, in which data is divided into partitions, each of which can be accessed and modified independently. The issue of data partitioning is orthogonal to speculative execution and lies outside the scope of this paper. We leave extending Creek to support partial replication for future work.
In Section VI we compare the performance of Creek to the performance of Bayou, SMR as well as Archie [26] , the state-of-the-art speculative SMR scheme. Archie uses a variant of optimistic atomic broadcast to disseminate requests among servers that guarantees that in the stable conditions (when the leader of the broadcast protocol does not change), the optimistic message delivery order is the same as the final one. Similarly to Creek, Archie utilizes multiversioning scheme and takes full advantage of the multi-core hardware.
Recently there have been several attempts to formalize the guarantees provided by Bayou and systems similar to it. Shapiro et al. [36] propose a (rather informal) definition of capricious total order, in which each server total-orders all operations it received, without prior agreement with others. In [37] , Girault et al. propose a more formal property called monotonic prefix consistency. The definition is, however, limited to systems that, unlike Creek, only feature read-only operations and updating operations that do not have a return value. To formalize Creek's correctness we use the framework and a property called fluctuating eventual consistency that we introduced in [24] (see Section V-B).
III. MODEL
We consider a fully asynchronous, message-passing system consisting of a set Π = {p 1 , ..., p n } of processes, to which external clients submit requests in the form of operations (also called transactions) to be executed by the processes. We model each process, which we call a replica, as a state automaton, that has a local state and, in reaction to events, executes steps that atomically transition the replica from one state to another. We consider a crash-stop failure model, in which a process can crash by ceasing communication. A replica that never crashes is said to be correct, otherwise it is faulty.
Replicas communicate via reliable channels. Replicas can use reliable broadcast (RB) [38] , that is defined through two primitives: RB-cast and RB-deliver. Intuitively, RB guarantees that even in case a faulty replica RB-casts some message m and it is RB-delivered by at least one correct replica, all other correct replicas eventually RB-deliver m. Formally, RB requires: (1) validity: if a correct replica RB-casts some message m, then the replica eventually RB-delivers m, (2) uniform integrity: for any message m, every process RB-delivers m at most once and only if m was previously RB-cast, and (3) agreement: if a correct replica RB-delivers some message m, then eventually all replicas RB-deliver m.
As we have already outlined earlier, clients may issue two kinds of operations: weak and strong. Weak operations are meant to be executed in a way that minimizes the latency in providing a response to the client. Hence, we require that a replica that received a weak operation executes it immediately in an eventually consistent fashion on the local state and issues a response to the client without waiting for coordination with other replicas. This behaviour is necessary (but not sufficient) to ensure that in the presence of network partitions (when communication between subgroups of replicas is not possible for long enough), the replicas' states in each subgroup converge once the stream of client requests ceases. Naturally, a response to a weak operation might not be correct, in the sense that it might not reflect the state of replicas once they synchronize. On the other hand, a replica returns to a client a (stable) response to a strong operation only after the replicas synchronize and achieve agreement on the final operation execution order (relative to other, previously handled operations). Achieving agreement among distributed consensus. replicas on how to execute (serialize) a strong operation requires solving We assume availability of failure detector Ω, the weakest failure detector capable of solving distributed consensus in the presence of failures [39] .
IV. CONDITIONAL ATOMIC BROADCAST A. Specification
Similarly to atomic broadcast (AB) (also called total order broadcast) [40] , CAB enables dissemination of messages among processes with the guarantee that each process delivers all messages in the same order. Unlike AB, however, CAB allows a process to defer the delivery of a message until a certain condition is met (e.g., certain network communication is completed). To this end, CAB defines two primitives: CAB-cast(m, q), which is used by processes to broadcast a message m with a test predicate q (or simply, predicate q), and CAB-deliver(m) to deliver m on each process but only when the predicate q is satisfied. Since q might depend on m, we write q(m) = true if q is evaluated to true (on some process p i ). q needs to guarantee eventual stable evaluation, i.e., q needs to be a stable predicate that eventually evaluates to true on every correct process. Otherwise, not only CAB would not be able to terminate, but different processes could CAB-deliver different sets of messages. We formalize CAB through the following requirements:
• validity: if a correct process p i CAB-casts a message m with predicate q, and eventual stable evaluation holds for q, then p i eventually CAB-delivers m, • uniform integrity: for any message m with predicate q, every process p i CAB-delivers m at most once, and only if (m, q) was previously CAB-cast and q(m) = true at p i , • uniform agreement: if a process p i (correct or faulty) CAB-delivers m (with predicate q), and eventual stable evaluation holds for q, then all correct processes eventually CAB-deliver m (with q), • uniform total order: if some process p i (correct or faulty) CAB-delivers m (with predicate q) before m (with predicate q ), then every process p j CAB-delivers m (with q ) only after it has CAB-delivered m (with q).
B. Reducing CAB to indirect consensus
There is a strong analogy between CAB and atomic broadcast (AB) built using indirect consensus [20] . Our approach is quite a straightforward extension of the AB reduction to indirect consensus presented there, as we now discuss.
As shown in [41] , AB can be reduced to a series of instances of distributed consensus. In each instance processes reach agreement on a set of messages to be delivered. Once the agreement is reached, messages included in the decision value are delivered in some deterministic order by each process. Indirect consensus reduces the latency in reaching agreement among the processes by distributing the messages (values being proposed by the processes) using a gossip protocol and having processes to agree only on the identifiers of the messages. Hence, a proposal in indirect consensus is a pair of values (v, rcv ), where v is a set of message identifiers (and msgs(v) are the messages whose identifiers are in v), and rcv is a function, such that rcv (v) is true only if the process has received msgs(v). Indirect consensus' primitives are almost identical to the ones of classic distributed consensus: propose(k, v, rcv ) and decide(k, v), where k is the number identifying a concrete consensus execution. Naturally, whenever a decision is taken on v, indirect consensus must ensure that all correct processes eventually receive msgs(v). We formalize this requirement by assuming eventual stable evaluation of rcv (v).
2 Formally, indirect consensus requires:
• termination: if eventual stable evaluation holds, then every correct process eventually decides some value, • uniform validity: if a process decides v, then (v, rcv ) was proposed by some process, • uniform integrity: every process decides at most once, • uniform agreement: no two processes (correct or not) decide a different value, • no loss: if a process decides v at time t, then for one correct process rcv (v) = true at time t. In indirect consensus, the rcv (v) function explicitly concerns local delivery of messages, whose identifiers are in v. However, rcv could be replaced by any function f that has the same properties as rcv , i.e., eventual stable evaluation holds for f . In CAB, instead of rcv (v), we use a conjunction of rcv (v) and test predicates q(m) for each CAB-cast message m, whose identifier is in v. This way we easily obtain an efficient implementation of CAB, because we minimize the sizes of propositions, on which consensus is executed. The complete reduction of CAB to indirect consensus follows the approach from [20] and is presented in Appendix A. We formally show that the reduction satisfies the requirements of 2 In the original paper [41] , this requirement has been called hypothesis A.
CAB. In practice, a very efficient implementation of CAB can be obtained by slightly modifying the indirect variant of MultiPaxos [42] .
V. CREEK
A. Basic scheme Our specification of Creek, shown in Algorithm 1, is rooted in the specification of the Bayou protocol [16] presented in [24] . We assume that clients submit requests to the system in the form of operations with encoded arguments (line 15), and await responses. Operations are defined by a specification of a (deterministic) replicated data type F [43] (e.g., read/write operations on a register, list operations, such as append, getFirst, or arbitrary SQL queries/updates). Each operation is marked as weak or strong (through the strongOp argument). Operations are executed on the state object (line 4), which encapsulates the state of a copy of a replicated object implementing F (see how StateObject can be implemented in Appendix B).
Upon invocation of an operation op (line 15), it is wrapped in a Req structure (line 17) that also contains the current timestamp (stored in the timestamp field) which will be used to order op among weak operations and strong operations executed in a tentative way), and its unique identifier (stored in the dot field, which is a pair consisting of the Creek replica number i and the value of the monotonically increasing local event counter currEventNo). Such a package is then distributed among replicas using some gossip protocol (here represented by reliable broadcast, line 23; we simply say that op has been RB-cast and later RB-delivered; through the code in lines 22 and 24 we simulate immediate local RB-delivery of op). If op is a strong operation, we additionally attach to the message the causal context of op, i.e., the identifiers of all operations that have already been RB-delivered by the replica and which will be serialized before op (line 19). 3 This information can be effectively stored in a dotted version vector (dvv) [44] , which is logically a set of pairs of a replica identifier and an event number (in the causalCtx variable, line 7, a replica maintains the identifiers of all operations the replica knows about, see the routines in lines 26 and 32). For a strong operation, the replica also CAB-casts the operation's identifier with a test predicate specified by the checkDep function (line 20). By specification of CAB, checkDep(dot) (line 10) is evaluated by each replica when solving distributed consensus on a concrete operation identifier dot, that is about to be CAB-delivered, and then, after the decision has been reached, in an attempt to CAB-deliver dot locally. The function checks whether the replica has already RB-delivered the strong operation op identified by dot, and if so, whether it has also already RB-delivered all operations that are in the causal context of op. Note that a replica will CAB-deliver op's identifier only if it had already RB-delivered op's Req structure. When an operation op is RB-delivered (line 26), the replica adds its identifier to causalCtx if op is a weak operation (line 30), and then uses op's timestamp to correctly order op among other weak operations and strong operations targeted for speculative execution (on the tentative list of Reqs, line 39). Then the new operation execution order is established by concatenating the committed list and the tentative list (line 40). The committed list maintains the Req structures for all operations, whose final execution order has already been established. Then, the adjustExecution function (line 42) compares the newly established operation execution order with the order in which (some) operations have already been executed (see the executed variable). Operations, for which the orders are different, need to be rolled back (in order opposite to their execution order) and reexecuted. In an ideal case, op is simply added to the end of the toBeExecuted list, and awaits execution. 4 To limit the number of possible rollbacks, local clocks, which are used to generate timestamps for Req structures, should not deviate too much from each other.
When an operation op's identifier is CAB-delivered (line 32), the replica can commit op, i.e., establish its final execution order. To this end, the replica firstly stabilizes some of the operations, i.e., moves the Req structures of 4 Note that no rollbacks will be required also when operation execution lags a bit behind the RB-delivery of operations. In such case, the tail of the toBeExecuted list will undergo reordering. all operations included in the causal context of op from the tentative list to the end of the committed list (line 49). Then the replica add op's Req structure to the end of the committed list as well (line 51). Note that this procedure maintains the relative order in which weak operations from the causal context of op appear on the tentative list. This procedure also maintains the causal precedence of those operations in relation to op. All operations not included in the causal context of op stay on the tentative list (line 50). As before, the adjustExecution function is called to mark some of the executed operations for rollback and reexecution (line 54). Note that in an ideal case, operations (including op) can be moved from the tentative to the committed list without causing any rollbacks or reexecutions. Unfortunately, if any (weak) operation submitted to some other replica is ordered in-between operations from the causal context of op, and some of these operations are already executed, rollbacks cannot be avoided in the basic version of Creek. In Section V-C we discuss how this situation can be mitigated to some extent.
Recall that the causal context of a strong operation op does not include the identifiers of any strong operations that are not yet committed. We cannot include such dependencies because, ultimately, the order of strong operations is established by CAB, which is unaware of the semantics and the possible causal dependency between messages sent through CAB. Hence, the order of strong operations established by CAB could be different from the order following from the causal dependency we would have had defined. In principle, such dependencies could be enforced using Zab [45] or executive order broadcast [46] . However, these schemes would have to be extended to accommodate the capabilities of CAB. We opted not to further complicate the presentation of Creek. In Creek, the identifier dot of a strong operation op is added to the global variable causalCtx (which we use to create a causal context for all strong operations) only upon CAB-deliver. But then we commit op, thus establishing its final execution order.
Operation rollbacks and executions happen within transitions specified in lines 58-61 and 62-76. Whenever an operation is executed on a replica given, the replica check whether the operation has been originally submitted to this replica (line 65). Then, when necessary, it returns the response to the client. Note that in our pseudocode, before a client receives a stable response to a strong operation, it may receive multiple tentative responses, one for each time the operation is (re)executed. Sometimes the replica returns a stable response in the commit function (line 48). It happens when a strong operation has been speculatively executed in an order equivalent to its final execution order.
B. Correctness
The most faithful description of the characteristics of Creek can be made using the framework from [24] , where we analyze the behaviour and then formalize the guarantees of the seminal Bayou protocol [16] . Creek's principle of operation is very similar to Bayou's, and so Creek also exhibits some of Bayou's quirky behaviour. Most crucially, Creek allows for temporary operation reordering, which means that the replicas may temporarily disagree on the relative order in which the operations submitted to the system were executed. In consequence, clients may observe operation return values which do not correspond to any operation execution order that can be produced by traditional relational database systems or typical NoSQL systems. As we prove, this characteristics is unavoidable in systems that mix weak and strong consistency. The basic version of Creek is also not free of the other two traits of Bayou mentioned in [24] , namely circular causality and unbounded wait-free execution of operations. The former can be mitigated in a similar fashion as in Bayou.
Formally, the guarantees provided by Creek can be expressed using Fluctuating Eventual Consistency (FEC) [24] , a property that precisely captures temporary operation reordering and is not tied to a concrete data type. 5 In Appendix C we argue why Creek satisfies FEC for weak operations and sequential consistency [47] for strong operations.
C. High-performance protocol
An obvious optimization of Creek involves executing weak read-only operations without performing any network communication with other replicas. This optimization does not address the core limitation of Creek, which comes from excessive 5 Creek does not make any assumptions on the semantics of operations issued to replicas other than that operations must be deterministic. number of operation rollbacks and reexecutions. To improve Creek's performance, we modified Creek in several ways. In our discussion below we focus on the updating operations.
Since rolling back operations is costly, we need to perform rollbacks only if necessary. Suppose there are two already executed operations op i , op j ∈ tentative, and op i appears before op j on tentative. If op j is moved to committed (e.g., because op j is being committed and op i does not belong to the causal context of op j ), the basic version of Creek must rollback both operations and reexecute them but in the opposite order. However, if op i and op j operated on distinct data, no rollbacks or reexecutions are necessary (at least with respect to only these two operations). Typical workloads exhibit locality, i.e., the requests do not access all data items with uniform probability [48] . Hence, such an optimization brings dramatic improvement in Creek's performance.
To facilitate efficient handling of situations similar to the one described above, we extended Creek with multiversioning scheme [21] . The modified version of Creek holds multiple immutable objects called versions for data items accessed by operations. Versions are maintained within a version store. Each version is created during execution of some operation op and is marked using a special timestamp that corresponds to the location of op on the committed · tentative list. The execution of any operation op happens in isolation, on a valid snapshot. It means that the snapshot includes all and only the versions created as the result of execution of all operations op , such that op appears before op on committed · tentative at the time of execution of op. A rollback of op does not dispose of versions created during its execution. Instead, all versions created during execution of op are marked, so they are not included in the snapshots used during execution of all operations op that start execution after the rollback of op.
A rollback of op may cascade into rollbacks of other operations. Suppose as before that there are two already executed operations op i , op j ∈ tentative and op i appears before op j on tentative. Suppose also that op x is RB-delivered, and op x has a lower timestamp than op i . In the basic version of Creek, both op i and op j would be rolled back and reexecuted after the execution of op x . Thanks to multiversioning, we can execute op x on a consistent snapshot corresponding to the desired order of op x on tentative and then check, whether the execution of op x created new versions for any objects read by op i . If not, we do not need to roll op i back and we can proceed to check in a similar way the possible conflict between op x and op j . On the other hand, if op i is rolled back, we need to check for conflicts between op x and op j as well as between op i and op j , because op j might have read some no longer valid versions created by op i .
Note that one needs to be careful in garbage collecting versions. Since a newly RB-delivered operation can be placed in the middle of the tentative list, we need to maintain all versions produced during execution of the operations on the tentative list. We track live operations (operations being executed) to see which snapshots they operate on. This way we never garbage collect versions that might be used by live operations. Having that in mind, for each data item we can attempt to garbage collect all versions which were created during executions of operations op ∈ committed , except for the most recently created value. We can also eventually remove all versions created by operations that were later rolled back (by specification of Creek, new transactions that start execution after the rollback already happened will not include the rolled back versions in their snapshots).
Under normal operation, when strong operations are committed every once in a while, the number of versions for each data item should remain roughly the same. However, when no strong operations are being committed (because no strong operations are submitted for a longer period of time or no message can be CAB-delivered due to a network partition), the number of versions starts to grow. We could counter such a situation by, e.g., periodically issuing strong no-op operations, that would gradually stabilize weak operations. Otherwise, we need to maintain all versions created by operations op ∈ tentative. In such case, we could limit the amount of data we need to store, by collecting complete snapshots (that represent some prefix of committed · tentative), and recreate some versions when needed, by reexecuting some previously executed operations on the snapshot.
Thanks to multiversioning, we could relatively easily further extend Creek to the support concurrent execution of multiple operations. Having multiple operations execute concurrently does not violate correctness, because each operation executes in isolation and on a consistent snapshot. The newly created versions are added to our version store after the operation completes execution. We do so atomically and only after we checked for conflicts with other concurrently executed operations which already completed their execution. In case of a conflict, we discard versions created during the execution and reexecute the operation.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Since Creek has been designed with low latency in mind, we are primarily interested in the on-replica latencies (or simply latencies) exhibited by Creek when handling client requests (the time between a replica receives a request from a client and sends back a response; the network delay in communication with the client is not included). One can expect that from a client's perspective, important are the stable latencies for strong requests and the tentative latencies for weak requests: when a request is marked as strong, it means it is essential for the client to obtain a response that is correct (results from a state that is agreed upon by replicas). On the other hand, weak requests are to be executed in an eventually consistent fashion, so the client expects that the tentative response might not be 100% accurate (i.e., the same as the stable response produced once the request is stabilized).
We compare the latencies exhibited by Creek with the latencies produced by other replication schemes that enable arbitrary semantics. To this end we test Creek against SMR [18] [19] , Archie [26] (a state-of-the-art speculative SMR), and Bayou [16] (mainly due its historical significance). For all systems we also measure the average CPU load and network congestion. Moreover, for Creek and Archie we check the accuracy of the speculative execution, i.e., the percentage of weak operations, for which the first speculative execution yielded results that match the ultimate results corresponding to this request. Archie, as specified in [26] , does not return tentative responses after completing speculative execution. We can however predict what would be the tentative latency for Archie and thus we plot it alongside stable latency.
Recall that Creek (similarly to Bayou) uses a gossip protocol to disseminate (both weak and strong) operations among replicas. To ensure minimal communication footprint of the interreplica synchronization necessary for strong operations, Creek uses an indirect consensus-based implementation of CAB. On the other hand, Archie and efficient SMR implementations (e.g., [49] ) disseminate entire messages (operations) solely through atomic broadcast (AB). Since our goal is to conduct a fair comparison between the schemes, our implementations of SMR and Archie rely on a variant of AB that is also based on indirect consensus.
A. Test environment
We test the systems in a simulated environment, which allows us to conduct a fair comparison: all systems share the same implementation of the data store abstraction and the networking stack, the sizes of the exchanged messages are uniform across systems (apart from the additional messages exchanged through CAB in Creek), and all statistics related to the test executions are measured in the same fashion. We simulate a 5-replica system connected via 1Gbps network. Each replica can run up to 16 tasks in parallel (thus simulating a 16-core CPU).
For our tests we use TPC-C [25] , a popular OLTP benchmark. Every test run involves a uniform stream of client requests (transactions), each randomly marked weak or strong and sent to a randomly chosen replica. The fraction of strong transactions in the workload depends on the strong transaction percentage (stxp) parameter, set to 10%. The network communication latencies are set to represent the typical latencies achieved in a data center (0.2-0.3 ms). To simulate different contention levels, we conduct tests with the TPC-C scale factor set to 1 and 5 (the dataset contains either 1 or 5 warehouses; smaller number of warehouses means higher contention).
B. Test results
In Figure 1 we present the on-replica latencies for all systems in the function of achieved throughput. In all tests the network is not saturated for any of the systems: messages exchanged between the replicas are small and transactions take a significant time to execute. SMR and Bayou, whose maximum throughput is about 2.7k txs/s (regardless of the contention level), are easily outperformed by Creek and Archie, both of which take advantage of multicore architecture. The latter systems' peak throughput is about 12k txs/s for the high contention scenario and 35k txs/s for the medium contention scenario. When CPU is not high contention medium contention zoom on low throughput saturated, Creek's latency for tentative responses (for both weak and strong transactions) is steady around 0.3 ms, which corresponds to the average time of executing a TPC-C transaction in the simulation. Creek's latency in obtaining a stable response is a few times higher, as producing the response involves inter-replica synchronization. More precisely, to produce a stable response, a request needs to be CAB-cast, which means that under our assumptions and using a Paxos-based implementation of CAB, the request can be CAB-delivered after 3 communication phases. Hence, network communication adds at least about 1 ms to the latency. In both medium and high contention scenarios, the stable latencies for strong transactions in Creek are about 15% lower compared to the latencies exhibited by Archie (see also below). In Creek, CPU utilization gradually increases with the increasing load. Eventually, the CPU saturates and, when the backlog of unprocessed transactions starts to build up (as signified by the latency plot striking up), Creek reaches its peak throughput.
Returning tentative responses makes little sense, when most of the time they are incorrect (they do not match the stable responses). Our tests show, however, that the tentative responses produced by Creek are in the majority of cases correct: the accuracy of the speculative execution ranges between 92-100% in the high contention scenario and between 99-100% in the medium contention scenario (see Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix D).
The tentative response latency observed for Creek is up to 3 times smaller than for Archie. It is because before an Archie's replica can start processing a transaction, it first needs to broadcast and deliver it. More precisely, an Archie replica starts processing a transaction upon optimistic delivery of a message containing the transaction, which was sent using AB. The speculative execution in Archie has little impact on stable latency: on average, before a speculative transaction execution is completed by an Archie replica, an appropriate AB message is delivered by the replica, thus confirming the optimistic delivery order (hence the perfect accuracy of the speculative execution, see Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix D). It means that a replica starts the execution of a transaction a bit earlier than it takes for a message to be delivered by AB. The small benefits of returning a tentative response earlier can be seen on the bottom-left and bottom-right plots in Figure 1 , which show the zoomed-in views over the top plots (for modest workloads). 6 In the high contention scenario, for both Creek and Archie the execution ratio (the average number of executions performed for each transactions) gradually increases from 1 to almost 1.9, when CPU gets saturated (see Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix D). The execution ratio is slightly higher for Creek compared to Archie's due to Creek's higher variance in the relative order between tentatively executed transactions. Archie curbs the number of rollbacks and reexecutions by allowing the replicas to limit the number of concurrently executed transactions. Moreover, in Archie, when the leader process of the underlying AB does not change, the optimistic message delivery order always matches the final delivery order. For the medium contention scenario, the execution ratio for both systems ranges from 1 to 1.3, with smaller differences between the systems. SMR executes all transactions sequentially, after they have been delivered by AB. It means that SMR exhibits high latency compared to Creek and Archie, and has very limited maximum throughput. Bayou cuts the latency compared to SMR, because Bayou speculatively executes transactions before the final transaction execution order is established. However, its maximum throughput is comparable to SMR's, as Bayou also processes all transactions sequentially.
C. Varying test parameters
Now we briefly discuss how the systems' behaviour change once we vary the test parameters. The additional test results are presented in Figures 2, 3 and 4 in Appendix D.
A low contention level (when the scale factor in TPC-C is set to 20) translates into better overall throughput (about 40k txs/s) and more uniform latencies for both Creek and Archie. In this scenario, transactions in both systems are rarely rolled back (the execution ratio never exceeds 1.1), because there are few conflicts between concurrently executed transactions. In these conditions, Creek always achieves perfect accuracy of speculative execution. Understandably, a low contention level does not have any impact on the performance of SMR, which executes all transactions sequentially. Bayou's performance is similar to its performance in the other scenarios.
Increasing the percentage of strong transactions means that the latency of stable responses for strong transactions in Creek is now a bit closer to Archie's latency. It is because now, on average there are fewer transactions in the causal context of each strong transaction, and thus the transaction can be CAB-delivered earlier. The smaller causal contexts also translate into a slightly higher execution ratio, as fewer transactions can be committed together (recall that a strong transaction stabilizes weak transactions from its causal context upon commit). Changes to the stxp parameter neither impacts the performance of SMR nor Bayou.
Now we consider what happens when transactions take longer to execute. In the additional tests we increased the transaction execution time five times. Understandably the maximum throughput of all systems decreased five times. The maximum execution ratio for both Creek and Archie is lower than before, because there are fewer transactions issued concurrently. Longer execution times also mean that the inter-replica communication latency has smaller influence on the overall latency in producing (stable) responses (execution time dominates network communication time). In effect, when stxp is high (50%), the latency of stable execution in Creek matches the (tentative/stable) execution latency in Archie, and the latency of Bayou is closer to SMR's. When stxp is relatively low (10%), the latency for Creek is lower compared to Archie's due to the same reasons as before.
Understandably, using machine clusters containing more replicas do not yield better performance, because all tested replication schemes assume full replication. Consequently every replica needs to process all client requests. To improve the horizontal scalability of Creek, it needs to be adapted to support partial replication. We leave that for future work.
Using CPUs with more cores has no effect on SMR and Bayou, but allows Creek and Archie to (equally well) handle higher load. We skip the plots for these tests, as they resemble the already shown results but scaled out to higher maximum throughput values.
D. Limitations
Similarly to Bayou, but unlike Archie and SMR, Creek remains available under network partitions (naturally, stable responses for strong transactions are provided only in the majority partition, if such exists). Under a heavy workload, Creek takes a long time to reconcile system partitions once the connection between the partitions is reestablished: the execution order of many transactions needs to be revisited, which means that they have to be reexecuted. In principle there is no other way to do it if we make no assumptions about the system semantics. Making such assumptions could allow us in some cases to, e.g., efficiently merge the states of the replicas from different partitions, as in CRDTs [5] .
E. Summary
As shown by the TPC-C tests, Creek greatly improves the latency compared to Archie, the state-of-the-art speculative SMR system, and also provides much better overall throughput than SMR and Bayou. In fact, the tentative latency exhibited by Creek is up to 3 times lower compared to Archie's. Moreover, when the percentage of strong transactions is relatively low, Creek improves the stable latency by 15% compared to Archie (when the percentage of strong transaction is high, the stable latencies exhibited by Creek and Archie are comparable). Crucially, the tentative responses provided by Creek for both weak and strong transactions are correct in the vast majority of cases. Naturally, eventually consistent systems which restrict the semantics of operations (e.g., by providing only CRUD semantics), such as Apache Cassandra [3] , can perform much better than Creek. It is because these systems limit or avoid altogether operation reexecutions resulting from changes in the order in which the updates are processed. However, as we argued in Section I, these systems are not suitable for all applications and are difficult to use correctly.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented Creek, a proof-of-concept, eventually-consistent, transactional scheme that also enables execution of strongly consistent requests. By its design, Creek provides low latency in handling client requests and yields throughput that is comparable with a state-of-the-art speculative SMR scheme. Creek does so while remaining general: it supports execution of arbitrary (deterministic) transactions. We believe that the Creek's principle of operation can be used as a good starting point for other mixed-consistency replication schemes which are optimized for more specific use.
APPENDIX

A. Reducing CAB to indirect consensus
The complete reduction of CAB to indirect consensus follows the approach from [20] and is presented in Algorithm 2.
In Algorithm 2 each process maintains a set of RB-delivered messages in received . We use the unordered set to keep the identifiers of messages received but not yet ordered by the process, and the ordered list, to store the identifiers of messages ordered but not yet CAB-delivered by the process.
In order to CAB-cast a message m with predicate t, both m and t are first RB-cast to other processes (line 8). Once a process RB-delivers a message, it is added to the received set (line 12). If the message has not been already ordered, its identifier is placed in the unordered set (line 14). Whenever the unordered set is not empty, a process initiates another indirect consensus execution and tries to propose the unordered set (line 17). A process p i agrees to terminate an indirect consensus instance on a set of message identifiers idSet k (line 18) only if p i has already RB-delivered all messages, whose identifiers are in idSet k (as in indirect consensus), but also for each message the test predicate holds on p i (line 10). Once a decision on a set of message identifiers is reached, messages whose identifiers are in idSet k are deterministically ordered (line 20), and CAB-delivered in a proper order by p i when the content of the message is available (line 22). Now we will show that Algorithm 2 satisfies CAB. 7 To this end, we formulate a number of lemmas first. Lemma 1. Let p i be a correct process. If, for some message m (with predicate q), id (m) ∈ idSet k at p i , where k is some decided instance of indirect consensus (IC), then p i eventually CAB-delivers m.
Proof. We give a proof by contradiction. Assume that p i never CAB-delivers m, and m is the first such message. Since id (m) ∈ idSet k , by the algorithm, id (m) on the ordered list. Since m is the first not CAB-delivered message, m = ordered .head . Since idSet k has been decided (at some time t), by the no loss property of IC, the function test has been evaluated to true at some correct process (say p j ) at time t. Hence for all messages m , such that id(m ) ∈ idSet k , m must be RB-delivered at p j at time t, and q(m ) must be true at p j at time t. By the agreement property of RB p i eventually RB-delivers all such messages m (including m). By eventual stable evaluation, eventually q(m ) = true at p i . Then, by the algorithm, p i must CAB-deliver m, which contradicts our assumption. Lemma 2. Let p i be any process. If, for some message m (with predicate q), id (m) ∈ idSet k at p i , where k is some decided instance of indirect consensus, then there does not exists process p j and k = k, so that id (m) ∈ idSet k at p j , where k is some decided instance of indirect consensus. 7 The original paper on indirect consensus [20] does not include formal correctness proofs of the reduction of AB to indirect consensus.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that k < k. Let us make two observations:
• any process p i can only proceed to round k > k after k is decided at p i , and every process decides only once per IC instance (by the uniform integrity property of IC), • any process p i proposes through IC id (m) (for some message m) only if id (m) ∈ unordered at p i at that time. Now we consider two cases: 1) Let m ∈ unordered at p i . It means that p i RB-delivered m and p i will not RB-deliver m again (by the uniform integrity property of RB). Since id (m) ∈ idSet k at p i then id (m) is removed from the unordered set and subsequently added to the ordered list on p i . Hence p i will not propose id (m) in any IC instance k > k. 2) p i has yet to RB-deliver m. Since id (m) ∈ idSet k at p i , then id (m) is added to the ordered list on p i . When p i RB-delivers m, by the algorithm, m will not be added to the unordered set. So again p i will not propose id (m) in any IC instance k > k For id (m) to be in idSet k decided in any IC instance k > k, some process would have to propose id (m) in instance k . But as we saw, it is impossible. Lemma 3. Algorithm 2 satisfies the validity property of CAB.
Proof. We need to show that if a correct process p i CAB-casts a message m with predicate q, and eventual stable evaluation holds for q, then p i eventually CAB-delivers m. We give a proof by a contradiction. Assume that p i never CAB-delivers m (with q).
Since p i CAB-casts a message m with predicate q, there exists some message msg, such that msg.m = m and msg.q = q, which was RB-cast by p i . Since p i is correct, by the validity property of RB, p i RB-delivers msg. By the agreement property of RB all correct processes will eventually RB-deliver msg.
Upon RB-delivery of msg, p i adds id (m) to the unordered set and then repeatedly proposes id (m) until id (m) is no longer in unordered . Since all correct processes will eventually RB-deliver msg, all propositions in some instance k of IC will contain id (m). By the termination property of IC, some decision is made for instance k. By the uniform validity property of indirect consensus, this decision must be idSet k , such that id (m) ∈ idSet k . Then, by Lemma 1 p i eventually CAB-delivers m, a contradiction. Proof. We need to show that for any message m with predicate q, every process p i CAB-delivers m at most once, and only if (m, q) was previously CAB-cast and q(m) = true at p i .
The last condition follows directly from the algorithm. We now consider the rest of the conditions.
From the algorithm we know that in order for processes p i to CAB-deliver m (with q), message msg, such that msg.m = m and msg.q = q must be in received at p i . It means that 
6:
msg.m = m
7:
msg.q = q
8:
RB-cast(msg)
9: function test(ids : set Message id ) 10:
return ∀id ∈ ids : ∃msg ∈ received : id(msg) = id ∧ msg.q(msg.m)
11: upon RB-deliver(msg : Message) 12:
received = received ∪ {msg}
13:
if id(msg) ∈ ordered then 14:
// a consensus is run whenever there are unordered messages 16:
17:
propose(k, unordered, test) // k distinguishes independent consensus executions
18:
wait until decide(k, idSet k )
19:
idSeq k = elements of idSet k (in some deterministic order) 21 :
// delivers messages ordered and received
23:
CAB-deliver(msg.m)
24:
ordered = ordered.tail p i must RB-deliver msg. By the uniform integrity of RB, some process must have had RB-cast msg. By the algorithm, it could only happen when some process CAB-cast m with predicate q. It means that the process must have RB-cast some message msg, such that msg.m = m and msg.q = q. For m to be CAB-delivered by p i , id (m) must be in ordered at p i . By Lemma 2 there exists only one instance k of IC, such that id (m) ∈ idSet k at p i . By the algorithm, id (m) ∈ ordered at p i . Once p i CAB-delivers m, p i removes id (m) from the ordered list. This way m cannot be CAB-delivered more than once.
Lemma 5. Algorithm 2 satisfies the uniform agreement property of CAB.
Proof. We need to show that if a process p i (correct or not) CAB-delivers m (with predicate q), and eventual stable evaluation holds for q, then all correct processes eventually CAB-deliver m (with q).
Since p i CAB-delivers m (with q), by the algorithm m ∈ received on p i , and q is satisfied on p i . Also by the algorithm, id (m) ∈ isSet k of some decided IC instance k at p i . By the no loss property of IC, when p i decides in instance k (at some time t), one correct process (say p j ) must have evaluated the test function to true. Hence at time t:
1) m ∈ received at p j , and 2) q = true at p j . It means that p j must have had RB-delivered m (with q). By the agreement property of RB, all correct processes will eventually RB-deliver m (with q). By eventual stable evaluation, q(m) is eventually true for all correct processes. By the termination property of IC, each correct process p j eventually decides in instance k. By the uniform agreement property of IC, p j decides on idSet k and id (m) ∈ idSet k . By Lemma 1, each correct process p j CAB-delivers m. Lemma 6. Algorithm 2 satisfies the uniform total order property of CAB.
Proof. We must show that if some process p i (correct or faulty) CAB-delivers m (with predicate q) before m (with predicate q ), then every process p j CAB-delivers m (with q ) only after it has CAB-delivered m (with q).
Let id (m) be decided in some instance k of IC, and id (m ) be decided in some instance k of IC. By Lemma 2, there do not exist other instance k and k in which id (m) and id (m ) are decided, respectively. We have three cases to consider:
• if k = k , then it is obvious that all processes must CAB-deliver m and m in the same order (they are CAB-delivered in some deterministic order by sorting idSet k , • if k < k then, by the algorithm, every process first needs to CAB-deliver all messages with identifiers in idSet k before it can CAB-deliver messages with identifiers from idSet k (idSeq k /idSeq k is appended to the ordered list at the process and messages are CAB-delivered at the process according to the order of the ordered list.
• if k > k , by the above argument every process first needs to CAB-deliver all messages with identifiers in idSet k before it can CAB-deliver messages with identifiers from idSet k ; this however is impossible by our assumption that some process p i (correct or faulty) CAB-delivers m before m . Hence, all processes CAB-deliver m and m in the same order. for (id, v) ∈ undoMap do 18:
B. The state properties
We follow the description from [24] . Algorithm 3 shows a pseudocode of StateObject, a referential implementation of state for arbitrary F (a specialized one can be used for a specific F). We assume that each operation can be specified as a composition of read and write operations on registers together with some local computation. The assumption is sensible, as the operations are executed locally, in a sequential manner, and thus no stronger primitives than registers (such as CAS, fetch-and-add, etc.) are necessary. The StateObject keeps an undo log which allows it to revoke the effects of any request executed so far.
C. Correctness guarantees of Creek
As explained in [24] , Bayou exhibits a phenomenon which we call circular causality. This phenomenon signifies a situation in which, by examining the return values of the operations processed by a system, one may discover a cycle in the causal dependency between the operations. This behavior can be observed in some Creek's executions. the duplicate(),
Consider an execution in which a weak operation observes the tentative executions of two strong operations (op a and op b ) in one order (say op a , op b ), and then some other weak operation observes the same two strong operations in the opposite order (op b , op a ), when the strong operations are committed. In order to avoid circular causality, the execution of strong operations must be deferred until the final execution order is known. In our algorithm, we would add a strong operation op to executed only after its identifier has been CAB-delivered.
Informally, in order to prove that Creek satisfies sequential consistency [47] for strong operations, we need to show that the stable return values produced by Creek are such that they can be obtained by a sequential execution of all operations in some total order that respects the program order of every replica. Intuitively, this total order corresponds to the order of operations on the committed list. Note that in Creek the execution of operations always respects the order in which each replica invokes operations: weak operations invoked by each replica p i are ordered using their timestamps and dots, both of which are monotonically increasing. When p i invokes a strong operation op, it has a timestamp that is at least as large as the timestamp of the last weak operation invoked by p i , but the strong operation's dot is strictly larger than dot of every weak operation invoked previously by p i . Hence the tentative execution of op will happen after the execution of all weak operations invoked previously by p i . When the identifier of op is CAB-delivered and thus op moved from the tentative to the committed list, the relative order between op and weak operations previously invoked by p i is maintained (see the commit function).
Creek satisfies fluctuating eventual consistency (FEC) for weak operations. Intuitively, FEC requires that each operation observes some serialization of (a subset) of operations already submitted to the system (each operation executes on a replica state that has been obtained by a serial execution of the operations given). However, the serializations observed by different weak operations gravitate towards one, ever growing single serialization. In other words, any operation op can be observed only a finite number of times by other operations in an order which is not equal to the final execution order of op. The observed serialization corresponds to the committed ·tentative list in Creek. When the identifiers of strong operations are CAB-delivered, operations are moved from the tentative to the end of the committed list. Hence, committed corresponds to the ever growing single serialization to which all serializations observed during executions of weak operations and tentative executions of strong operations gravitate.
D. Additional results of experimental evaluation
In Figures 2, 3 and 4 we present some additional test results, which are discussed in Section VI-C. Test results for scenarios with high contention (TPC-C is setup with scale factor 1). Besides the on-replica latency and the execution ratio we also present the measured accuracy of speculative execution. Test results for scenarios with medium contention (TPC-C is setup with scale factor 5). Besides the on-replica latency and the execution ratio we also present the measured accuracy of speculative execution. . Besides the on-replica latency and the execution ratio we also present the measured accuracy of speculative execution.
